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Article 6

98 N.C. L. REV. 369 (2020)

THE EXPANSIVE REACH OF PRETRIAL
DETENTION*
PAUL HEATON **

INTRODUCTION
Today we know much more about the effects of pretrial detention than we
did even five years ago. Multiple empirical studies have emerged that shed new
light on the far-reaching impacts of bail decisions made at the earliest stages of
the criminal adjudication process. 1 This new evidence calls into question
longstanding approaches to managing pretrial risk that provide limited due
process protection and emphasize cash bail.
Making appropriate decisions about who to release pretrial and under what
conditions requires an understanding of the impacts of particular bail
requirements. For example, for a given defendant, how would their risk of
failure to appear (“FTA”) or future criminal activity change if they were
subjected to condition A (which might include preventative detention) versus
condition B (which might include an alternative to detention, such as text
message reminders of scheduled court appearances)? Armed with such
information, decisionmakers could appropriately balance society’s dual interest
in preserving public safety and holding the accused accountable with
defendants’ liberty interests. However, until recently, the actual evidence
necessary to analyze the trade-off described above has been virtually
nonexistent, leading judges and magistrates to rely on a combination of personal
experience (possibly including conscious or unconscious bias), heuristics, and
local norms in formulating their bail decisions.
One reason it has been so difficult to develop good evidence of the effects
of pretrial detention is because the bail system, when operating as intended,
sorts defendants in a manner that limits the value of the outcome data it
produces for demonstrating whether and how bail conditions matter. In general,
* © 2020 Paul Heaton.
** Senior Fellow and Academic Director of the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration
of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Special thanks to John Hollway, Ross Miller, and
participants in the 2018 Yale Law School Liman Center Colloquium and 2019 Association of American
Law Schools Symposium on “Court Debt”: Fines, Fees, and Bail, Circa 2020 for helpful conversations
that improved this Article. Havan Clark and the North Carolina Law Review provided excellent editorial
assistance.
1. See discussion infra Part I.
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because bail conditions are typically assigned based on perceived defendant risk,
if we observe elevated violation rates for defendants with condition A versus
condition B, it is difficult to determine empirically whether this reflects an
adverse causal effect of condition A or simply the fact that those assigned
condition A were different from those assigned condition B to begin with. For
example, proponents of cash bail often cite low FTA rates among those released
with assistance from commercial bonding agents and argue from such statistics
that private bondsmen are a necessary component of the system to manage
nonappearance risk. 2 However, comparing FTA rates for those with and
without commercial sureties is misleading. To maximize profits, commercial
operations have an incentive to accept only clients who are at low risk of
nonappearance in the same way that an auto insurer would make money by
identifying and then insuring only the safest drivers. 3 Thus, low FTA rates
might simply reflect defendant sorting and tell policymakers little about
commercial sureties’ effectiveness.
The new generation of pretrial detention studies addresses this difficulty
and provides a much stronger footing on which to base legal decisions and
criminal justice policy. Recent studies improve upon past work in at least three
respects. First, they make use of large administrative datasets, typically
involving the near universe of criminal offenses within a particular jurisdiction,
allowing researchers to describe the functioning of the criminal justice system
as a whole rather than generalizing from a few specific incidents or cases.
Second, they carefully consider the problem of differentiating correlation from
causation, making use of natural experiments to measure the causal effects of
detention and resolving the sorting problem described above. Finally, they
consider a broader range of outcomes, focusing not just on the resolution of the
case at hand, but on long-term ramifications, such as future criminal activity,
earnings, and unemployment.
The takeaway from this new generation of studies is that pretrial detention
has substantial downstream effects on both the operation of the criminal justice
system and on defendants themselves, causally increasing the likelihood of a
conviction, the severity of the sentence, and, in some jurisdictions, defendants’
likelihood of future contact with the criminal justice system. Detention also
reduces future employment and access to social safety nets. This growing
evidence of pretrial detention’s high costs should give impetus to reform efforts
2. Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, AM. BAIL COALITION,
http://www.americanbailcoalition.org/Resources/Pretrial-Release-Of-Felony-Defendants-In-StateCourts/ [https://perma.cc/9G4E-R49V] (“Compared to release on recognizance, defendants on
financial release were more likely to make all scheduled court appearances.”).
3. See, e.g., Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics
in Pictures, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 115–16 (2011) (depicting the basic theory of selection in insurance
markets and its implications for welfare and public policy).

98 N.C. L. REV. 369 (2020)

2020]

REACH OF PRETRIAL DETENTION

371

that increase due process protections to ensure detention is limited to only those
situations where it is truly necessary and identify alternatives to detention that
can better promote court appearance and public safety.
I. RECENT STUDIES MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION
Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang offer a notable recent example from this new
line of research. 4 The authors obtained administrative court records for
Philadelphia and Miami-Dade counties covering the period from 2006 to 2014,
ultimately resulting in an analysis sample of over 300,000 cases in Philadelphia
and nearly 100,000 in Miami-Dade. 5 The court records provide information
about bail, nonappearance, case outcomes, and future offending. 6 To these data,
the researchers link individual-level IRS tax data, recording earnings and
employment information. To obtain causal estimates, the researchers exploit
the random assignment of bail magistrates to cases, empirically demonstrating
that defendant and case characteristics are uncorrelated with judge assignment.
But because judges vary in the leniency with which they apply bail guidelines,
judge assignment influences the ultimate likelihood that individual defendants
are detained pretrial. 7 This natural experiment furnishes an opportunity to
measure outcomes for otherwise similar pools of defendants who vary in their
access to pretrial release. Thus, as would be the case in a randomized clinical
trial, the authors can measure the causal effect of pretrial detention.
Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang demonstrate that pretrial detention reduces the
likelihood of FTA by sixteen percentage points, but that this improvement in
appearance rates comes with substantial ancillary consequences. 8 Detention
increases defendants’ likelihood of pleading guilty from 33% to 44% (a 32%
increase), and the reductions in rearrest that accrue from incapacitating
defendants pretrial are completely offset by increases in post-trial offending. 9
As of three to four years post-adjudication, detention reduces the likelihood of
employment from 47% to 38% (a 20% decrease) and reduces defendants’
likelihood of accessing social safety net programs like the earned income tax
credit. 10
These findings are in keeping with several other recent studies of pretrial
detention. For example, Gupta, Hansman, and Frenchman use data from

4. Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction,
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 201
(2018).
5. Id. at 210.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 217–19.
8. Id. at 224–30.
9. Id. at 212, 214, 224–25.
10. Id. at 212, 214, 227–30.
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Pittsburgh and Philadelphia and also exploit the randomization of defendants
to bail magistrates to measure the effects of a cash bail condition (as compared
to release on recognizance or nonmonetary conditions) on outcomes. 11 They
find that cash bail increases conviction likelihood from 50% to 56% (a 12%
increase), 12 does not measurably reduce nonappearance (at least as captured by
an imperfect proxy of bench warrants), 13 and increases future crime by 9%. 14
Also using data from Philadelphia, Stevenson shows that detention, in
particular, increases the likelihood of conviction by 13%, 15 lengthens sentences
by 42%, 16 and increases fees owed to the court (other than bail) by 41%. 17 Leslie
and Pope confirm these patterns in a study of nearly one million criminal cases
in New York City, demonstrating that detention increases the probability of
conviction by 20% (thirteen percentage points) for felony cases and 11% (seven
percentage points) for misdemeanor cases and more than doubles average
incarceration sentence length. 18 The data also shows that a substantial fraction
of the Black-White and Hispanic-White disparity in incarceration rates can be
attributed to pretrial detention. 19 Turning to the federal system, Didwania
demonstrates, using a sample of over 100,000 federal defendants, that detention
substantially increases sentence length and reduces the likelihood that
defendants receive substantial assistance 20 sentencing credits. 21
All of these studies use the random assignment of bail magistrates to cases
to address the sorting problem and measure causal effects. Heaton, Stevenson,
and Mayson take a different approach by demonstrating—using a sample of
nearly 400,000 misdemeanor cases in Harris County, Texas—that defendants
arraigned on a day closer to the weekend are more likely to be released than
those arraigned earlier in the week, despite being assigned identical bail
amounts and appearing otherwise similar on observable characteristics. 22 These
differences in detention plausibly result from the fact that obtaining release
11. Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail:
Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 472 (2016).
12. Id. at 487.
13. Id. at 496–97.
14. Id. at 495.
15. Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability To Pay Bail Affects Case Outcomes,
34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511, 532 (2018).
16. Id. at 535.
17. Id. at 534.
18. Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes:
Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. ECON. 529, 543, 547 (2017).
19. Id. at 551.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
21. Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate Consequences of Pretrial Detention 4 (June 3,
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
22. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 756 (2017).
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requires someone else to show up to post bail, which is logistically harder on
weekdays due to scheduling and liquidity constraints. Such logistical challenges
are likely unrelated to the underlying guilt or innocence of defendants but do
affect how cases are ultimately resolved, as would be expected if pretrial
detention causally impacts outcomes. In this study, detention is shown to
increase the likelihood of pleading guilty from 53% to 66% (a 25% increase) and
more than double sentence length. 23 While initially reducing crime through
incapacitation, as of eighteen months post-hearing, detention increases felony
offending by 30% and misdemeanor offending by 23%. 24 Misdemeanor cases
present a particular problem for bail policy due to the possibility that pretrial
detention can cause defendants to essentially accrue their entire expected
sentence while awaiting trial, a situation which creates perverse incentives for
innocent defendants to plead guilty to crimes that they did not commit to
shorten their jail stay. 25
To summarize, a robust collection of empirical studies using high-quality
administrative data, spanning multiple jurisdictions and years, and
encompassing different research designs provides consistent evidence that
pretrial policies have important downstream consequences. Release conditions
causally affect the guilt/innocence determination, sentence length, and the
future economic prospects of defendants. Detention can also increase future
crime, meaning that the prospect of incapacitation in the near term must be
balanced against future crime in assessing whether regimes that act to detain
truly protect or instead actually harm public safety.
II. STUDIES’ IMPLICATIONS FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION SYSTEMS
These findings carry important implications for legal challenges to existing
pretrial systems and their design more broadly. First, because the decision to
detain will, in effect, be a decision to convict for some defendants, the process
of determining who gets detained requires the robust procedural protections
that apply in other phases of the criminal process. 26 For example, it is well
established that the Sixth Amendment requires access to counsel in criminal
cases where imprisonment is imposed, 27 but the “critical stage” analysis applied
by the Supreme Court to preliminary stages of the adjudication process has yet
23. Id. at 747.
24. Id. at 718, 761–66.
25. Id. at 715–16, 784–86; see also Shima Baradaran Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L.
REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2020) (manuscript at 11, 16–17, 17 n.69) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (arguing that pretrial policy should operate differently depending on whether a defendant is
accused of a misdemeanor or a felony).
26. See Caliste v. Cantrell, 329 F. Supp. 3d 296, 312 (E.D. La. 2018), aff’d, 937 F.3d 525 (5th Cir.
2019).
27. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
37–38 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963).
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to be definitively extended to bail hearings. 28 Given the now-robust body of
evidence showing that the outcome of the bail hearing, if detention, can have as
its practical result the imposition of a jail sentence, it seems pertinent that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel should extend to such hearings.
Second, lack of individualization in bail procedures also raises concerns.
Many jurisdictions continue to rely heavily on bail schedules that set
presumptive bail amounts based on current charge severity and/or prior
criminal history. 29 Such schedules, which do not take into account ability to
pay, 30 will necessarily detain some fraction of criminal defendants, which will
again have the practical effect of determining guilt for some. It seems obvious
that an adjudication process that convicts defendants because they belong to a
broadly defined group—without an individualized inquiry into their
circumstances—would raise serious due process concerns. The pretrial process
creates something close to such a system today in many communities.
Third, critics of existing bail procedures have also attacked them on equal
protection grounds. 31 Several new-generation studies demonstrate that the
burdens of pretrial detention are disproportionately borne by low-income
individuals or minorities. Heaton, Mayson, and Stevenson, for example, show
that, compared to defendants assigned identical cash bail amounts (who thus
presumably represent the exact same degree of “risk” from the perspective of
the court), defendants residing in the poorest 10% of zip codes are detained 1.6
times as often as those residing in the wealthiest 10% of zip codes. 32 Leslie and
Pope demonstrate that the adverse causal effects of being detained pretrial are
similar for Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites, but Black felony defendants are
fourteen percentage points (roughly 45%) more likely to be detained than White
defendants, and Hispanic felony defendants are nine percentage points
(roughly 30%) more likely to be detained than White defendants. 33 Arnold,
Dobbie, and Yang apply an outcomes test to bail decisions in Miami and
Philadelphia to test for racial bias. 34 In essence, their test examines whether
Black defendants experience bail failures at a lower rate than similarly situated
White defendants, which should not occur if magistrates are optimizing their
28. See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
404 (1977); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967).
29. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF COUNTY
PRETRIAL RELEASE POLICIES, PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES 7 (2009), https://university.pretrial.org/
HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=bb5a2ba0-6c0a-eb4d-816a3c8083e5e388&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/22AN-L5CV] (indicating that, as of 2009, 64% of the
most populous counties in the nation used bail schedules).
30. Id. at 6.
31. See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 152 (5th Cir. 2018).
32. Heaton et al., supra note 22, at 741.
33. Leslie & Pope, supra note 20, at 550–51.
34. David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. ECON.
1885, 1888 (2018).
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bail decisions absent racial discrimination. 35 They find that rearrest rates for
White defendants at the margin of release—that is, those just above the
threshold separating those who get released from those who are detained—are
twenty-three percentage points higher than those for marginal Black
defendants, a pattern strongly suggestive of racial bias against Blacks. 36
As these studies demonstrate, pretrial detention disproportionately
impacts racial minorities and the poor, meaning that these groups bear the brunt
of higher conviction rates, longer sentences, and other adverse collateral
consequences that flow from detention. The uneven application of pretrial
detention has triggered constitutional equal protection challenges to cash bail
systems in several jurisdictions. 37 Although litigation is ongoing, courts have
indicated a willingness to invalidate pretrial detention regimes on equal
protection grounds when there is strong evidence that they produce wealthbased discrimination in application. 38
Defenders of the status quo contend that the large volume of cases flowing
through the criminal justice system necessitates shortcuts such as bail schedules,
uncounseled hearings, or reliance on private bail enforcement; without such
shortcuts, they argue, the pretrial process would become intolerably protracted
or costly. 39 Under this view, pretrial process simplifications serve to get
defendants to pretrial release more quickly and thus actually mitigate the harms
of pretrial detention. However, the close—indeed causal—relationship between
detention and conviction demonstrated in recent research renders this view
problematic. Few would argue that abrogating constitutional protections, such
35. See id.
36. Id. To understand why this suggests bias, notice that, by definition, for those on the margin
of being released, a decisionmaker should be roughly indifferent as to whether they are released or
detained. Absent any discrimination, this indifference should imply that the decisionmaker could
detain one additional White defendant and release one additional Black defendant without any loss of
utility. Doing so would have the benefit of reducing the rearrest rate because the marginal Black
defendant has a lower rearrest rate than the marginal White defendant. The fact that decisionmakers
do not make this seemingly efficiency-enhancing exchange suggests that the utilities are not balanced
as would be the case if the decisionmakers were racially neutral.
37. See Alexander Bunin, The Demise of Money Bail, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2018, at 11, 12.
38. See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 163 (5th Cir. 2018) (“In sum, the essence of the
district court’s equal protection analysis can be boiled down to the following: take two misdemeanor
arrestees who are identical in every way—same charge, same criminal backgrounds, same circumstances,
etc.—except that one is wealthy and one is indigent. Applying the County’s current custom and
practice, with their lack of individualized assessment and mechanical application of the secured bail
schedule, both arrestees would almost certainly receive identical secured bail amounts. One arrestee is
able to post bond, and the other is not. As a result, the wealthy arrestee is less likely to plead guilty,
more likely to receive a shorter sentence or be acquitted, and less likely to bear the social costs of
incarceration. The poor arrestee, by contrast, must bear the brunt of all of these, simply because he has
less money than his wealthy counterpart. The district court held that this state of affairs violates the
equal protection clause, and we agree.”).
39. Effectiveness and Cost, AM. BAIL COALITION, http://ambailcoalition.org/effectiveness-andcost/ [https://perma.cc/WKX8-QHB6].
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as confrontation of witnesses or the reasonable doubt standard, would be an
appropriate way to address the crush of high criminal caseloads, even if doing
so would help some innocent defendants escape the criminal process sooner.
Such protections are viewed as essential to ensure the integrity of the
guilt/innocence determination. Jettisoning constitutional protections in the
pretrial context, we now know, raises similar concerns because of the close
connection between what happens in the bail hearing and the verdict that will
ultimately be recorded.
What other lessons does this new raft of empirical research hold for those
attempting to improve current practices? Empirical data shows more
definitively than ever that pretrial detention carries high costs—not simply in
terms of the fiscal burdens associated with housing people during their term of
pretrial custody, although these are considerable, 40 but also through increases in
wrongful convictions, augmented future criminal activity, and impairment of
defendants’ future economic outcomes. 41 While ensuring court appearance is a
legitimate policy objective, in light of these high costs, pretrial detention should
only be a final resort used sparingly and only after other less costly alternatives
prove ineffective. A corollary is that investments that reduce reliance on pretrial
detention—by, for example, diverting some defendants away from the criminal
justice system toward social services,42 improving the information available to
decisionmakers at the initial bail hearing, 43 or providing supportive services to
enable defendants to make it to court 44—may generate net savings even if they
40. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2017);
Bernadette Rabuy, Pretrial Detention Costs $13.6 Billion Each Year, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Feb. 7,
2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/02/07/pretrial_cost/ [https://perma.cc/3SVC-2NFN].
41. See supra Part I.
42. An example of a promising practice in this area is Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion
(“LEAD”). See KATHERINE BECKETT, LAW, SOC’YS & JUSTICE PROGRAM & DEP’T OF
SOCIOLOGY, UNIV. OF WASH., SEATTLE’S LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION PROGRAM:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE FIRST TWO YEARS 3, 17, 41–46 (2014),
https://www.fordfound.org/media/2543/2014-lead-process-evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BCKE3FB]; see also Susan E. Collins, Heather S. Lonczak & Seema L. Clifasefi, Seattle’s Law Enforcement
Assisted Diversion (LEAD): Program Effects on Recidivism Outcomes, 64 EVALUATION & PROGRAM
PLAN. 49, 49–50, 52–53, 55 (2017).
43. PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT: SCIENCE PROVIDES GUIDANCE
ON ASSESSING DEFENDANTS 5–6 (2015), https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/
PJCC/Pretrial%20risk%20assessment%20science%20provides%20guidance%20on%20assessing%20def
endants.ashx [https://perma.cc/2B5Q-D2V8].
44. See, e.g., BRICE COOKE ET AL., UNIV. OF CHI. CRIME LAB & IDEAS42, USING BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES: PREVENTING FAILURES TO APPEAR IN
COURT
16–18
(2018),
https://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/3b31252760b28d3b
44ad1a8d964d0f1e9128af34/store/9c86b123e3b00a5da58318f438a6e787dd01d66d0efad54d66aa232a64
73/I42-954_NYCSummonsPaper_Final_Mar2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NDX4-2XC9]
(court
reminders via text message); Rochelle Olson, Who Says There’s No Free Ride? Grant Will Get Public
Defender Clients to Court, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis Oct. 31, 2018, 7:38 PM),
http://www.startribune.com/who-says-there-s-no-free-ride-grant-will-get-public-defender-clients-tocourt/499213381/ [https://perma.cc/46LQ-4S2L].
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require appreciable upfront investments to establish or continuing funding to
operate. 45 The growing, high-quality evidence showing that pretrial detention
reaches further and costs more than was previously recognized should stoke new
urgency in efforts to ensure that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to
trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”46

45. See Heaton et al., supra note 22, at 787 (noting that Harris County, Texas, could have averted
$20 million in supervision costs by releasing criminal defendants who were detained pretrial and would
have otherwise been releasable after paying $50).
46. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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